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Abstract
Wilson's impossibility theorem (Wilson(1972)) about Arrovian social welfare functions
(Arrow(1963)) states that there exists a dictator or an inverse−dictator for any non−null social
welfare function which satisfies the conditions of unrestricted domain, non−imposition and
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Among these conditions IIA is very strong and
controversial. We will show that, under the condition of strict non−imposition which is
stronger than non−imposition, IIA can be replaced by weaker condition. We call this
condition "monotonicity". We will also show that under strict non−imposition it is necessary
and sufficient condition for Wilson's theorem, that is, it is equivalent to dictatorship or
inverse−dictatorship of Arrovian social welfare functions under unrestricted domain and
strict non−imposition.
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Wilson’s impossibility theorem (Wilson (1972), or Binmore (1976)) about Arrovian social wel-
fare functions (Arrow (1963)) states that there exists a dictator or an inverse-dictator for any
non-null social welfare function (SWF) which satisﬁes the conditions of unrestricted domain,
non-imposition and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Arrovian social welfare func-
tions (SWFs) are collective choice rules which are complete and transitive. They are null if the
social preferences generated by them are indifferent over all pairs of alternatives. Among above
conditions IIA is very strong and controversial. We will show that, under the condition of strict
non-imposition which is stronger than non-imposition, IIA can be replaced by a weaker condi-
tion. We call this condition monotonicity . We will also show that under strict non-imposition
monotonicity is necessary and sufﬁcient condition for Wilson’s theorem, that is, it is equivalent
to the existence of one of dictator and inverse-dictator for Arrovian social welfare functions
under unrestricted domain and strict non-imposition.
Monotonicity is a two-fold condition. One of the following conditions (1) and (2) is satisﬁed.
(1) If for a pair of alternatives x and y at some proﬁle p:
(i) individuals in a group G prefer x to y,
(ii) individuals in a group G0 are indifferent between them,
(iii) the other individuals prefer y to x,
and the society prefers x to y, then at another proﬁle where individuals in G and G0 prefer
x to y, the society must prefer x to y.
(2) If for a pair of alternatives x and y at some proﬁle p:
(i) individuals in a group G prefer x to y,
(ii) individuals in a group G0 are indifferent between them,
(iii) the other individuals prefer y to x,
and the society prefers y to x, then at another proﬁle where individuals in G and G0 prefer
x to y, the society must prefer y to x.
We call the former the normal form and the latter the inverse form of monotonicity.
Strict non-imposition for a SWF means that for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A there exists at
least one proﬁle of individual preferences such that the society prefers x to y. 1
In the next section we present notations, terminologies and some preliminary results. In that
section we will show that under strict non-imposition any SWF satisﬁes weak Pareto optimal-
ity or inverse weak Pareto optimality if it satisﬁes monotonicity. In Section 3 we will prove
Wilson’s impossibility theorem under strict non-imposition using monotonicity instead of IIA.
In Section 4 we will show that this condition is equivalent to the existence of one of dictator
and inverse-dictator for Arrovian social welfare functions under unrestricted domain and strict
non-imposition. In the Appendix we will show that IIA with weak Pareto optimality (respec-
tively, inverse weak Pareto optimality) implies the normal form (respectively, inverse form) of
monotonicity.
1 On the other hand, non-imposition for a SWF means that for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A there
exists at least one proﬁle such that the society prefers x to y, or is indifferent between them.
12 Notations, deﬁnitions and preliminary results
A is the set of alternatives. The number of alternatives is larger than 2. N = {1,2,...,n} is the
ﬁnite set of individuals with n = 2. Each individual i is endowed with a weak ordering Ri of
A. A weak ordering is a complete and transitive binary relation. The strict preference and the
indifference of individual i are denoted by Pi and Ii. Let R denote the set of all weak orderings
of A. A proﬁle p is a function mapping N into the set Rn of all logically conceivable proﬁles.
For each i p assigns a weak ordering Ri, p0 assigns a weak ordering R0
i and so on.
A collective choice rule (CCR) is a mapping of Rn into the set of social preferences over A. If a
CCR generates a complete and transitive social preference, then it is an Arrovian social welfare
function(SWF). At a proﬁle p the social preference is denoted by R, at a proﬁle p0 it is denoted
by R0 and so on. The strict preference and the indifference of R are denoted by P and I and so
on.
The conditions for SWFs to satisfy other than completeness and transitivity are as follows.
Unrestricted domain The domain of any SWF is the set of all logically conceivable proﬁles,
Rn.
Strict non-imposition If for some pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A the social preference is always
xRy irrespective of the preferences of individuals, the SWF is weakly imposed. We assume
that for any pair of alternatives any SWF is not weakly imposed. Strict non-imposition for
a SWF implies that for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A there exists at least one proﬁle such
that the social preference is xPy.
We do not require the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Instead we
assume the following condition.
Monotonicity Any social welfare function satisﬁes one of the following conditions.
(Normal form) Suppose that at some proﬁle p, for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A:
(1) individuals in a group G: xPiy,
(2) individuals in a group G0: xIiy,
(3) individuals in N − (G ∪G0): yPix,
and the social preference is xPy. At another proﬁle p0 if xP0
iy for individuals in G and G0,
then the social preference must be xP0y.
(Inverse form) Suppose that at some proﬁle p, for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A:
(1) individuals in a group G: xPiy,
(2) individuals in a group G0: xIiy,
(3) individuals in N − (G ∪G0): yPix,
and the social preference is yPx. At another proﬁle p0 if xP0
iy for individuals in G and G0,
then social preference must be yP0x.
Weak Pareto optimality For any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A, when all individuals prefer x to
y (xPiy for all i ∈ N), the social preference must be xPy.
Inverse weak Pareto optimality For any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A, when all individuals
prefer x to y (xPiy for all i ∈ N), the social preference must be yPx.
We do not assume weak Pareto optimality or inverse weak Pareto optimality. They are derived
from strict non-imposition and monotonicity.
2We deﬁne some other terminologies.
Almost decisive If for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A, when individuals in a group G prefer
x to y and the other individuals prefer y to x, the social preference is xPy, then G is almost
decisive over {x,y}.
We call a set of individuals which is almost decisive over any pair of alternatives an almost
decisive set.
Decisive If for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A, when individuals in a group G prefer x to y,
the social preference is xPy, then G is decisive over {x,y}.
Since in the deﬁnition of decisive it is not assumed that individuals other than those in G prefer
y to x, if G is decisive over {x,y}, then it is almost decisive over {x,y}.
Using decisive, dictator is described as follows.
Dictator The dictator is an individual who is decisive over all pairs of alternatives.
That is, if G is decisive over all pairs of alternatives, and G consists of only one individual, he
is the dictator.
Inversely almost decisive If for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A, when individuals in a group
G prefer x to y and the other individuals prefer y to x, the social preference is yPx, then G is
inversely almost decisive over {x,y}.
We call a set of individuals which is inversely almost decisive over any pair of alternatives
an inversely almost decisive set.
Inversely decisive If for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A, when individuals in a group G prefer
x to y, the social preference is yPx, then G is inversely decisive over {x,y}.
Using inversely decisive, inverse-dictator is described as follows.
Inverse-dictator The inverse-dictator is an individual who is inversely decisive over all pairs
of alternatives.
That is, if G is inversely decisive over all pairs of alternatives, and G consists of only one
individual, he is the inverse-dictator.
We can show the following lemma which is similar to Proposition 1 in Malawski and Zhou
(1994).
Lemma 1 For any SWF which satisﬁes unrestricted domain and strict non-imposition:
(1) If a SWF satisﬁes the normal form of monotonicity, we obtain weak Pareto optimality, that
is, for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A if xPiy for all i ∈ N we have xPy.
(2) If a SWF satisﬁes the inverse form of monotonicity, we obtain inverse weak Pareto opti-
mality, that is, for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A if xPiy for all i ∈ N we have yPx.
PROOF.
(1) By strict non-imposition for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A there is a proﬁle p1 where the
social preference is xP1y. Then, if the SWF satisﬁes the normal form of monotonicity, it
3implies that at any proﬁle p if xPiy for all i ∈ N we have xPy. Therefore, we obtain weak
Pareto optimality.
(2) By strict non-imposition for any pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A there is a proﬁle p1 where the
social preference is yP1x. Then, if the SWFs satisﬁes the inverse form of monotonicity, it
implies that at any proﬁle p if xPiy for all i ∈ N we have yPx. Therefore, we obtain inverse
weak Pareto optimality. 
3 Wilson’s impossibility theorem
In this section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 There exists one of dictator and inverse-dictator for any SWF which satisﬁes un-
restricted domain, strict non-imposition and monotonicity.
If a SWF satisﬁes the normal form of monotonicity, we obtain dictatorship, and if it satisﬁes its
inverseform,weobtaininverse-dictatorship.Theproofsoftwocasesareparallel.Sowepresent
a proof of only the inverse-dictatorship case. First we show the following standard lemma using
the inverse form of monotonicity instead of IIA.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a SWF satisﬁes the conditions of unrestricted domain, strict non-
imposition and the inverse form of monotonicity. If, for some pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A,
a group G is inversely almost decisive over {x,y}, then it is inversely decisive over all pairs of
alternatives.
PROOF. Let z be an alternative other than x and y. Consider the following proﬁle p:
(1) individuals in G: xPiyPiz,
(2) individuals in N −G: yPizPix.
Note that we can assume the existence of such a proﬁle because we assume unrestricted domain
for social welfare functions.
Since G is inversely almost decisive over {x,y}, we have yPx. By (2) of Lemma 1 we have
inverse weak Pareto optimality. It implies zPy because all individuals prefer y to z. Then, by
transitivity we obtain zPx. Since individuals in G prefer x to z and individuals in N − G prefer
z to x, inverse form of monotonicity implies that G is inversely decisive over {x,z}.
Let w be an alternative other than x and y. Consider the following proﬁle p0:
(1) individuals in G: wP0
ixP0
iy,
(2) individuals in N −G: yP0
iwP0
ix.
Since G is inversely almost decisive over {x,y}, we have yP0x. Inverse weak Pareto optimality
implies xP0w because all individuals prefer w to x. By transitivity we obtain yP0w. Since indi-
viduals in G prefer w to y and individuals in N −G prefer y to w, inverse form of monotonicity
implies that G is inversely decisive over {w,y}.
Next consider the following proﬁle p00:
4(1) individuals in G: wP00
i xP00
i z,
(2) individuals in N −G: zP00
i wP00
i x.
Since G is inversely decisive over {x,z}, we have zP00x. Inverse weak Pareto optimality implies
xP00w because all individuals prefer w to x. By transitivity we obtain zP00w. Since individuals
in G prefer w to z and individuals in N −G prefer z to w, inverse form of monotonicity implies
that G is inversely decisive over {w,z}.
Because w and z are arbitrary, repeatedly applying this logic the proof of this lemma will be
completed. 
By inverse weak Pareto optimality the set of all individuals N is inversely decisive over all pairs
of alternatives. It means that there exists at least one set of individuals which is inversely almost
decisive over some pair of alternatives, and since the number of individuals is ﬁnite, there exists
a minimum set which is inversely almost decisive over some pair of alternatives. We call such
a set a minimum inversely almost decisive set. Minimum means that the number of individuals
included in the set is minimum among all inversely almost decisive sets. Then, we can show
the following results.
Lemma 3 Suppose that a SWF satisﬁes the conditions of unrestricted domain, strict non-
imposition and the inverse form of monotonicity.
(1) If there are two inversely almost decisive sets, the set which is the intersection of these two
sets is also an inversely almost decisive set.
(2) We can not have multiple disjoint inversely almost decisive sets.
(3) We can not have multiple different minimum inversely almost decisive sets.
PROOF.
(1) Denote two inversely almost decisive sets by G1 and G2. By Lemma 2 G1 and G2 are
inversely decisive over all pairs of alternatives. Select three alternatives x, y and z, and
consider the following proﬁle p:
(i) individuals in G1 −G2: xPiyPiz,
(ii) individuals in G1 ∩G2: zPixPiy,
(iii) individuals in G2 −G1: yPizPix,
(iv) individuals in N − (G1 ∪G2): yPixPiz.
Since G1 is an inversely almost decisive set, we have yPx. Similarly, since G2 is an in-
versely almost decisive set, we have xPz. Then, by transitivity we have yPz. Since only
individuals in G1 ∩G2 prefer z to y and all other individuals prefer y to z, by monotonicity
G1 ∩G2 is inversely decisive over {z,y}, and so it is inversely almost decisive over {z,y}.
(2) By Lemma 2 all inversely almost decisive sets are inversely decisive over all pairs of
alternatives. Suppose thatG andG0 are two disjoint such sets. If all individuals inG prefer
x to y, the social preference must be yPx. If, at the same time, all individuals in G0 prefer
y to x, the social preference must be xPy. It is a contradiction.
(3) Suppose that there are two different minimum inversely almost decisive sets, and denote
them by G and G0. Then, from (1) of this lemma the intersection of G and G0 is also
an inversely almost decisive set. Therefore, neither G nor G0 can not be the minimum
inversely almost decisive set. 
5This lemma means that the minimum inversely almost decisive set is unique. Then, we obtain
the following conclusion.
Lemma 4 Suppose that a SWF satisﬁes the conditions of unrestricted domain, strict non-
imposition and the inverse form of monotonicity. The minimum inversely almost decisive set
consists of only one individual.
PROOF. Denote the minimum inversely almost decisive set by G, and assume that it includes
more than one individual. Consider the following proﬁle p:
(1) one individual in G (denoted by j): zPjxPjy,
(2) individuals in G other than j (G − {j}): xPiyPiz,
(3) individuals in N −G: yPizPix.
z is an alternative other than x and y. Since G is an inversely almost decisive set, we have yPx.
If the social preference is xRz, by transitivity we have yPz. Then, since only individual j prefers
z to y and all other individuals prefer y to z, inverse form of monotonicity and Lemma 2 imply
that he is the inverse-dictator. Thus, if there is no inverse dictator, the social preference must be
zPx. Then, since individuals in G − {j} prefer x to z and all other individuals prefer z to x, by
monotonicity it is an inversely almost decisive set. It contradicts the assumption that G is the
minimum inversely almost decisive set. Therefore, G consists of only one individual. He is the
inverse-dictator. 
PROOF. [Proof of Theorem 1]
Theorem 1 is obtained from Lemmas 2, 3, and 4.
4 Equivalence of dictatorship or inverse-dictatorship and monotonicity
In this section we show the following result.
Theorem 2 Monotonicity is equivalent to the existence of one of dictator and inverse-dictator
for SWFs under unrestricted domain and strict non-imposition.
PROOF. Theorem 1 has shown that monotonicity implies dictatorship or inverse-dictatorship
of SWFs so that only the converse needs to be proved.
Assume that a dictatorial or inversely dictatorial SWF does not satisfy monotonicity. Then,
(1) Dictatorial SWF case: There is a case where for some pair of alternatives x,y ∈ A we
have two proﬁles p and p0 such that
(i) The social preference is xPy at p and yR0x at p0.
(ii) Individuals prefer x to y at p0 if they prefer x to y or are indifferent between them at
p.
6If the dictator prefers y to x at p, the social preference must be yPx. Therefore, xPiy or
xIiy for the dictator. Then, since he prefers x to y at p0, this SWF can not be dictatorial.
(2) Inversely dictatorial SWF case: There is a case where for some pair of alternatives x,y ∈
A we have two proﬁles p1 and p2 such that
(i) The social preference is yP1x at p1 and xR2y at p2.
(ii) Individuals prefer x to y at p2 if they prefer x to y or are indifferent between them at
p1.
If the inverse-dictator prefers y to x at p1, the social preference must be xP1y. Therefore,
xP1
iy or xI1
i y for the inverse-dictator. Then, since he prefers x to y at p2, this SWF can not
be inversely dictatorial. 
Appendix
In this appendix we show that IIA with inverse weak Pareto optimality implies the inverse form
of monotonicity. By similar procedures we can show that IIA with weak Pareto optimality
implies the normal form of monotonicity 2 . Let p be a proﬁle such that
(1) individuals in G: xPiy,
(2) individuals in G0: xIiy,
(3) individuals in N − (G ∪G0): yPix,
and yPx. Let p0 be a proﬁle such that
(1) individuals in G: xP0
iyP0
iz,
(2) individuals in G0: xI0
iyP0
iz,
(3) individuals in N − (G ∪G0): yP0
izP0
ix.
By inverse weak Pareto optimality zP0y, and by IIA yP0x. Then, transitivity implies zP0x. Con-
sider a proﬁle p00 such that
(1) individuals in G and G0: xP00
i zP00
i y,
(2) individuals in N − (G ∪G0): zP00
i x and zP00
i y.
By inverse weak Pareto optimality yP00z, and by IIA zP00x. Then, transitivity implies yP00x. By
IIA it implies the inverse form of monotonicity.
Example We present an example which shows that monotonicity is weaker than IIA. Suppose
that there are three alternatives x, y and z, and there are several individuals 1, 2 ..., n.
Let individual 1 be the dictator. If the dictator is indifferent between two alternatives, for
example, x and y, the social preference is determined by the Borda rule. This social welfare
function satisﬁes monotonicity because in the deﬁnition of monotonicity it is assumed that
no individual is indifferent between x and y, but it does not satisfy IIA 3 .
2 From Malawski and Zhou (1994) we know that IIA with non-imposition implies weak Pareto opti-
mality or inverse weak Pareto optimality.
3 About this example we refer to Denicol` o (1998).
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